Abstract
INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis tested the viability of the EU's single banking market and its underlying regulatory framework under severe market conditions. It has highlighted the gap between the degree of financial integration manifested by the presence of large cross-border banks, on one hand, and limited regulatory integration exemplified by the country-based bank resolution regimes, on the other. This paper analyzes the EU experience with the resolution of failing cross-border banks and reviews the search for reform options during the first year after the crisis.
Exogenous shocks such as financial crises tend to open policy windows for reforms that would be implausible during periods of stability (Kingdon 2003 , Rodrik 1996 , Drazen and Grilli 1993 . The 'benefit of crisis' argument emphasizes the fact that the crisis experience forces important stakeholders to reconsider their policy positions, thus opening space for policy entrepreneurs who are ready to explore new opportunities. Within the EU decisionmaking process, it is the Commission ---with its monopoly on legislative initiative ---that must decide whether the crisis created a policy window for path breaking reforms. This paper asks whether the crisis experience induced the Commission to propose a more radical reform of the EU bank resolution regime that goes beyond the pre-crisis status quo. To answer this question, we first review the crisis experience. Building on the game-theoretic analysis we show that national authorities face conflicting incentives stemming from their exclusively national mandates to protect financial stability at no or the lowest possible cost to domestic taxpayers. We apply the concept of a globalization trilemma to the problem of the cross-border bank resolution and argue that there are two first-best solutions capable of containing the conflicts among national authorities. The resolution regime can either be shifted to the EU-level, which provides the largest possible jurisdiction matching the operations of large European banking groups, or it could be shifted back to the national level, which would require the cross-border banks to reorganize as a string of independent national subsidiaries.
In the second part, we review the Commission's Communication on cross-border crisis management in the context of the existing academic and policy literature in order to ascertain whether the crisis indeed created a policy window and whether the Commission tried to seize it by supporting more radical reform options. 1 The paper provides answers to two simple questions: why did the Dutch and Belgians failed to resolve Fortis on multilateral bases despite the long tradition of cooperation and why is the EU not introducing reforms that could prevent such failures in future. The simple answer to both questions is the conflict of interests among key stakeholders. In the first case, uncertainty over the distribution of fiscal burdens undermines cross-border cooperation among national authorities, unless there are some binding commitments to cooperation and burden sharing. In the second case, the progress towards the EU level regime is blocked by member states' concerns about infringements on fiscal sovereignty, whereas re-embedding of cross-border bank subsidiaries in national regulatory regimes is inhibited by the Commission's and banks' concerns over regulatory protectionism. The paper concludes that although the crisis created political momentum for reform, it did not align the interests of the key stakeholders behind any of the two first-best reform alternatives.
We show that the first-best reform options were seriously considered. This is a marked change from the pre-crisis debate, which confined such options only to academic literature. However, in its impact assessment of the proposed reforms (Commission 2009), the Commission decided to rally behind the strengthening and deepening of the pre-crisis policies. As the policy debate nears the final decision, the first-best options have been sidelined and the traditional EU approach has regained prominence.
Unless the ongoing aftershocks of the financial crisis ---such as the Eurozone response to the Greek problems of 2010 ---open new policy windows on fiscal burden sharing, the post-crisis EU bank resolution regime will be merely an upgraded version of the pre-crisis one. Although such a regime constitutes an improvement, it preserves the conflicting incentives of national authorities that derail cooperative cross-border resolutions during crises. Such a regime lacks the capacity of the first-best solution to either prevent or internalize the positive and negative externalities of cross-border bank integration.
INTEGRATED BANKS AND THE NATIONAL RESOLUTION REGIME
During the pre-crisis decade, the EU had witnessed an unprecedented wave of crossborder mergers of large banks fueled by the internal dynamics of financial markets and the introduction of the euro (Dermine 2000 , Veron 2007 . At the onset of the financial crisis, there were 39 cross-border banks and around 100 other banking groups that had large subsidiaries or systemic branches in another member state (Commission 2009). Although they represent a small percentage of the total 8,300 EU banks, they are the most important as they control approximately 68% of total EU banking assets.
Many observers argued for an introduction of a resolution regime capable of handling cross-border failures of large banks (Dermine 2000 , Vives 2001 , Schoenmaker 2009 , but the attention of policy-makers was focused on the prevention of banking failures. The EU regulation and supervision regimes were updated through the Capital Requirement Directive, but the resolution regime received much less attention.
The resolution regime forms the third line of defense against financial instability. It is invoked when regulation and supervision fail to prevent the fatal moment when authorities must decide whether to let a bank fail or intervene to keep it as a going concern, even if it requires putting fiscal resources at risk. 2 An important goal of the bank resolution regime is to minimize the fiscal costs of banking crises. Although, there are rare cases when governments allow a large bank to fail or when a bank resolution is financed solely by the private sector, it is an empirically supported fact that governments tend to intervene and spend considerable resources in dealing with the consequences of banking crises. The EU experience during the 2007-2009 financial crisis Neither of the two options is appealing, especially in the case of systemically important banks. Bank failure and liquidation induces the immediate risk of financial panic throughout the system. Bank bailouts then translate into increased responsibility for operation of the financial system and accumulation of fiscal liabilities. 2 The bank resolution regime is a set of legal and administrative rules that authorities employ to support restructuring of an ailing bank, in order to maintain financial stability and ensure continuity of basic banking services. Certain functions of large banks such as credit provision, processing of payments and monetary transmission have the public good character and need to be preserved even if the bank becomes insolvent and should be wound up. The bank resolution regime, unlike corporate bankruptcy, recognizes these functions and provides tools to preserve them. conforms to this pattern. Nineteen EU governments introduced guarantees and recapitalizations, thus putting at risk fiscal resources equivalent to 32% of EU-wide GDP, out of which approximately a third was used by banks by mid 2010 (Commission 2010a). Such figures are consistent with the worldwide crisis experience over the last three decades, during which the estimated direct fiscal costs of a banking crisis were about 13% of GDP (Laeven and Valencia 2008) .
A novel aspect of public interventions in this crisis is their cross-border dimension. It is no longer sufficient to intervene on the national level, when an ailing bank is systemically important in several countries. The integration of banks introduced a new interdependency between governments, as the decision whether and how to intervene is related to the same choices of other governments. Unless any single government is willing to subsidize the resolution of a cross-border bank, they must cooperate and share the fiscal burden of the resolution.
As in other interdependent situations, there is a scope for strategic behavior. The choice situation resembles the prisoner's dilemma, when the cooperative solution is likely to be the least costly overall, but national authorities have an incentive to defect to a non-cooperative solution, if they believe that unilateral action would reduce their costs below their share in the cooperative solution. Two important characteristics further complicate cross-border resolution: firstly, banking crises tend to unfold with incredible speed and, secondly, the amount of fiscal resources required tends to be not only high, but also highly uncertain.
Nevertheless, cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game should still be achievable, if the authorities involved can communicate effectively and make ex ante commitments enforceable by an independent third-party (Scharpf 1997) . EU jurisdiction makes both of these conditions possible, providing that such communication and coordination rules are enshrined in EU legislation.
Time pressure, high stakes and high uncertainty make calculated decisions in the heat of a banking crisis difficult. Without effective and binding rules, the authorities may misjudge the situation and defect to a unilateral option. They often have lass than 60 hours, between the time banks closes on Friday and reopen Monday, to agree on a resolution scenario, which may simply be impossible. Similarly, if one government believes that it can manage the resolution better than its partners in other EU countries, or if it believes that part of a cross-border bank within its jurisdiction controls assets of better quality than parts in other EU countries, then it may opt for uncooperative unilateral action. To reduce the effects of time pressure and high uncertainty on the choice between cooperation and defection, ex ante rules are required that guarantee effective communication, guide the search for cooperative action and ensures acceptable sharing of fiscal burdens. The pre-crisis regime tried to provide such rules through soft law arrangements and voluntary cooperation among authorities.
THE PRE-CRISIS RESOLUTION REGIME
The pre-crisis resolution regime was not embedded in EU legislation. Overall, the pre-crisis cross-border resolution regime amounted to little more than soft law declarations supported by emerging committee-based governance mechanisms. The MoUs specified basic coordination rules, but left the burden sharing rules up to the colleges. These arrangements were explicitly voluntary and non-binding and thus unable to close the gap between cross-country banks and country-based resolution regimes, as demonstrated in the case of the Fortis resolution.
THE FORTIS EXPERIENCE
The Fortis resolution provided the most direct test of the EU cross-border bank resolution regime. The bank had a systemic presence in all three Benelux countries, which have a strong tradition of policy coordination. Moreover, it was one of the banking groups with the most developed ex ante cooperation arrangements among its supervisors that dated back to 2002 (Van den Spiegel 2008) . Nevertheless, when these arrangements were tested by the crisis, they failed to sustain a fully cooperative multilateral resolution. 4, 1 2, 2* Note: * Nash equilibrium. The higher the number in cell, the more preferred the outcome for given player.
Preferences are expressed in terms of ranking of pay-offs; the highest payoff (4) is the most preferred solution of a given actor. As our purpose is to demonstrate the conflicting incentives, we simplify the presentation of the Fortis case by focusing on the interaction between the Belgian and Dutch authorities. The Luxembourg government seemed willing to adapt to outcomes of their negotiations.
Given that all three governments were prepared to offer support to Fortis, multilateral action seemed to be the most likely option. Yet, the final resolution was unilateral. The answer to this puzzling outcome lies primarily in the absence of EU-level rules on banking resolutions that would credibly align the conflicting incentives of national authorities. Multilateral action would, in principle, be in the best interest of the intervening governments because it preserves the benefits of internal integration of cross-border banks and avoids the costs of breaking them up along national borders.
The Fortis directors believed that multilateral resolution would be more efficient (Fortis, 2008) , which is a view shared by some independent observers as well (Cihak and Nier, 2009) Cross-border banks such as Fortis gained considerable efficiencies from integrating their internal functions across national boundaries. Increasingly, strategic decision-making, capital management and allocation, risk management and auditing were concentrated at the headquarters of crossborder financial groups, while other functions ---such as back-office, information technologies, liquidity management, asset and liabilities management or human resources management ---were similarly concentrated on the group level, although not necessarily in the home country (van den Siegel 2008). Multilateral action should preserve this arrangement and avoid a chaotic break up of subsidiaries that are not operationally independent.
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However, a multilateral resolution inevitably pools not only the fiscal risk of intervention across participating countries, but also gives them a stake in later sales of assets that may offset the cost of intervention. Pooling these risks and benefits limits the extent of good and bad surprises, when governments opting for unilateral action discover that their part of the crossborder bank is in much better or worse shape than expected. However, the governments that believe the parts of the cross-border group in their territory are in much better shape than the others would then prefer unilateral action as a less costly option. Indeed, this was the Dutch justification for their ultimatum (Fortis 2008:17) , confirmed by the Dutch Finance Minister who argued that '[the Dutch side] had managed to buy the better part of Fortis, leaving the worse one to the Belgians' (Beck et al. 2010: 73) . The Minister of Finance also pointed out that the Dutch authorities joined the negotiations only on 28 September, when they advanced towards a solution that did not give the Dutch control in all entities they cared about (Het Financieele Dagblad, Dec 24, 2008) . They were offered 49% in Fortis Bank Netherlands, but ABN AMRO and Fortis insurance in the Netherlands remained under control of the Fortis entity in which the Belgian authorities invested. There was no time to renegotiate before the announcement of the plan. authorities judged multilateral action as more risky and expensive, they would ---in the absence of any rules committing them to minimize the overall resolution costs ---breach their fiduciary duties by agreeing to it. 7 The same logic applies to the Belgian authorities providing that they judge the price of the buyout of the Dutch parts as adequate. The problem of such an agreement may arise only if one or both sides misjudge the value of assets and the expected resolution costs due to uncertainty during a crisis. In such a case, one side may end up providing a massive cross-border subsidy towards the resolution costs, which may strain future relationships. assets were sold at too low a price and a greater part of the resolution burden remained with them.
9
Whatever the case may be, the Fortis resolution has clearly shown that the pre-crisis EU cross-border bank resolution regime was not robust enough to support the most efficient cooperative multilateral resolution. The communication procedures did not ensure full access 7 The Dutch were partially vindicated in their preference for unilateral resolution by the fact that they avoided the difficulties that the Belgian side experienced in obtaining shareholder approval for the sale of Fortis to BNP Paribas. 8 The UK and Dutch subsidy towards the resolution of the Icelandic banks' branches in these countries has put their relationship with Iceland under strain. Two years after the event, they are still trying to reach agreement on the repayment schedule. 9 When the sale was announced, the Financial Times questioned several market participants who argued that the Dutch bought the Fortis assets at a discount of as much as €10 bn (FT Oct 4, 2008).
to initial negotiations, which made the original plan unacceptable to the Dutch. The MoUs burden sharing rules were either non-existent or not helpful in the negotiations of a multilateral resolution under severe time pressure. The agreed ad hoc solution will prove acceptable, only as far as it strikes a reasonable balance in terms of sharing the fiscal burden of the resolution. Moreover, the sale was accepted only after a unilateral threat to seize the Dutch assets by forced administration; had the Dutch authorities not been flexible on price, the situation could have ended up in a deadlock inviting chaotic collapse and sharp conflict between the Dutch and Belgian authorities. Overall, the Fortis case represents a successfully managed failure of the EU cross-border resolution regime that in actuality could end up a lot worse.
The prisoner's dilemma outlines the conflicting incentives arising from the mismatch between the national accountability of resolution authorities and the cross-border character of banks. On a more general level, this represents the conflict among the three objectives of EU policy that aims to foster financial stability and cross-border banking, while respecting national bank resolution regimes. This conflict is well captured by the concept of the globalization trilemma that also delineates the policy space for post-crisis reforms.
A POLICY TRILEMMA
The policy trilemma states that only two out of the following three policy goals can be achieved simultaneously (Rodrik 2000, Schoenmaker and Oosterloo 2008) : (i) stability of the banking system under stress, (ii) sustaining an integrated cross-border bank under stress and (iii) maintaining national control over the bank resolution regime. The first goal is selfevident; the whole purpose of banking regulation, supervision and resolution regimes is maintaining financial stability. The second goal is implied by the Single Market objectives of the Treaty, which aims to establish the freedom of capital movement and freedom to provide services across the EU. The third goal is not an objective in its own right; rather it is a corollary of member states' desire to maintain control over their fiscal outlays and prevent the EU from making fiscal commitments on their behalf.
The trilemma implies that there are three possible outcomes. First, the EU may achieve its objectives of financial stability and integration, but sustaining these two goals under adverse market conditions would require member states to support a resolution regime for crossborder banks on the EU level (outcome 1, Figure 2 ). Second, financial stability under stress can be maintained if banks operate as nationally incorporated units with full operational and financial independence, i.e. they are not fully integrated in the internal structure of the transnational financial group, and thus their resolution can be performed on the national level without large externalities imposed on other countries (outcome 2). Third, integrated banks can be supported by a national resolution regime, but only at the expense of higher risk that their stability will not be maintained under difficult market conditions (outcome 3). The first outcome is the one to which the EU aspires. At the same time, it struggles to overcome the legal and political constraints associated with this option. The second outcome would largely mean a return to the pre-1992 situation when banking markets were mutually open, but crossborder banks were not operationally integrated. Finally, the third outcome is what was in place before the current crisis. The crisis experience offered an opportunity to reconsider the bank resolution framework.
It created a policy window for the Commission to try to propose more radical reforms. The remainder of this paper reviews the Commission's Communication on An EU Framework for
Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector. We ask whether the Commission considered any of the polar options suggested by the trilemma and specified in the academic literature and related policy reports.
THE EU-LEVEL RESOLUTION REGIME
The EU-level resolution regime for cross-border banks represents the first-best solution from the point of view of economic efficiency. It would allow for internalization of positive externalities, such as efficiency gains from cross-border integration, as well as negative externalities, such as contagion in the case of financial instability. It would permit resolution strategies that minimize the overall costs of bank resolution and prevent national responses that minimize national costs while increasing overall costs. In its most extreme form, the EUlevel resolution regime would be operated by a European Financial Supervision Agency that would operate according to EU law and be backed by EU-level fiscal capacity.
Schoenmaker (2009) explores the possibilities of creating a single EU financial regulator and proposes a similar process that led to the institutionalization of the ECB. However, he also points out that there is no Treaty base for a single financial regulator. The limited financial stability mandate that the Treaty confers on the ECB can be expanded neither to non-banking financial services, such as insurance and securities, nor to non-Eurozone countries. Thus, a change in the Treaty is a prerequisite for the creation of a single EU regulator that could avoid the conflict of incentives stemming from the national mandates of resolution authorities.
The rules for the resolution of cross-border banks could be provided by the '28th' EU-level legal regime operating alongside the national banking laws. Cihak and Decressin (2007) discuss the potential benefits of a European Baking Charter that would allow national banks to stay within the national regime, whereas cross-border banks could either accept an EUlevel regime or organize themselves as a holding company of national banks. They argue that creating an EU-level legal regime is more plausible than full harmonization of banking regulation, supervision and resolution across the EU. However, even if the resolution of crossborder banks is specified in a directive, fiscal backing is still necessary to make it operational.
Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2009) explore two possible mechanisms for EU-level fiscal burden sharing. The first proposal is based on full solidarity between EU member states; the second is specific to countries in which the given cross-border bank is present. Both mechanisms assume that either the ECB or the European Investment Bank (EIB) would be given the right to issue bonds to finance a cross-border resolution. The bonds would be guaranteed jointly by member states according to some capital key based on GDP shares and other variables. In the case of full solidarity, all EU members would guarantee and finance the scheme; in the case of a specific mechanism, only those where the cross-border bank operates would provide financing. However, as Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2009) funding mechanism that could be used.
RETURN TO NATIONAL RESOLUTION REGIMES
Splitting cross-border banks into a network of independent national entities is the polar opposite of an EU-level resolution regime. Such a reform would force banks to reorganize so that their operations, regulation, supervision and resolution would be conducted strictly on a national basis. This option ---dubbed subsidiarization ---would substantially reduce the mismatch between cross-border banks and national regulations by making banks national.
There would be no need for a cross-border regime, as banks would be resolved by national authorities, according to national rules and with national fiscal resources.
Many aspects of the current EU framework for retail commercial banks are compatible with subsidiarization. National subsidiaries ---but not branches ---of cross-border banks must meet all criteria for a banking license, thus they have formally independent management and governance systems and capital bases to meet prudential requirements. Although formally separate, many of the operational processes are centralized in practice, as was the case with On the other hand, the subsidiarization idea resonated within the EU host countries that were keen to protect their local subsidiaries, comparable to the Dutch authorities in the Fortis case. They insisted on bolstering their liquidity and capital positions given the new risks generated by the crisis, and were prepared to scrutinize carefully any intra-group transfers that trapped liquidity ---which could be used for stabilization of the whole cross-border The ESFS and EBA proposals reshape the governance arrangements but fall short of specifying any legislative rules guiding cross-border resolutions. The rules are derived only from the MoUs that call for, but do not prescribe, 'voluntary specific cooperation agreements'.
In its Communication, the Commission considered the compulsory introduction of recovery and resolution plans ('living wills') for all cross-border banks. Making banks responsible for such plans could ensure that the voluntary agreements are actually developed and agreed upon within the colleges of supervisors (see Avgouleas et al. 2010 ).
The ESFS/EBA regime and associated improvements in soft law rules could resolve the prisoner's dilemma by providing effective communication and credible commitment to ex ante rules. However, numerous safeguards reduce the credibility of the EBA's powers.
Moreover, the proposed governance arrangements remain punishingly complex, which is likely to render them inefficient under the time pressure and uncertainty of banking crises.
These improvements are unlikely to be equivalent to an EU-level resolution regime, thus the trilemma logic would still predict recourse to unilateral resolution of cross-border banks.
CONCLUSION
The crisis experience in general and the Fortis experience in particular made a strong case for the reform of the EU cross-border bank resolution regime. The Commission reflected on this crisis as well as on the reform options suggested in the literature. Ultimately, the Commission concluded that the political and legal constraints that prevented the adoption of the more robust pre-crisis regime remain firmly in place. Therefore, the crisis experience did not pave the way for more radical reforms, and the proposals in the Communication stick to the traditional recipe of deepening existing soft law and strengthening the pre-crisis governance framework. The initial response of the Council to related proposals on the financial supervision architecture also indicates that the traditional concerns over the fiscal sovereignty, on one hand, and market freedoms, on the other, will prevail. In short, the crisis experience did not lift any of these constraints and thus did not open a policy window for path-breaking reforms.
The EU is set on the reform path that relies on voluntary cooperation underpinned only by soft law rules and punishingly complex governance structures. These are not well suited to support multilateral resolution of cross-border banks that must be decided by national 
